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BOOK REVIEW

In the Tradition of Nelson
The Royal Navy in World War n
Robert Vogel

Correlli Barnett: Engage the Enemy More Closely
The Royal Navy in the Second World War. New
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991.
he attempt to encompass in a single volume
the history of the Royal Navy during the
Second World War calls for careful judgement
and considerable restraint. Barnett manages
to do both in his Engage the Enemy More
Closely, the first serious full-length study of
the Royal Navy since Roskill's magisterial The
War at Sea. But this book is not simply an
account of the operations of the Royal Navy
during the war. The structure of the book is
informed by Barnett's major premise that the
Royal Navy was the wall behind which, for the
first three years of war, the British Army and
the Royal Air Force gathered the strength
necessary to help defeat the German, Italian
and Japanese enemy. Consequently, unlike
the other two services, the Navy had to fight its
major battles largely with the organization and
the material with which it had entered the war.
The defeat of the U-boats, which had posed the
greatest threat to British survival, the virtual
annihilation of the German surface fleet and
the struggle in the Mediterranean leading to
the surrender of the Italian Fleet were
accomplished, for the most part, with the
somewhat outdated weapons with which the
Royal Navy began the war. The operations
leading to these victories, completed by 1943,
are described with clarity and with an eye on
the major strategic decisions taken at the

T

centre of the British wartime leadership. They
take up about two-thirds of the nearly 1000
pages of Barnett's work. In many respects all
these operations were basically defensive in
character and, given Churchill's penchant for
offensive operations, the Royal Navy never
received the kind of priority which its
importance to the British war effort clearly
warranted, a point which is particularly strongly
made in Chapter 15, 'The Battle oftheAir.' The
debate about providing the Navy with sufficient
long-range aircraft to help defeat the U-boats
was, in Barnett's view, "... the most important
single strategic debate of the war. It is,
moreover, the one case where Britain's survival
was imperilled not so much by enemy action in
itself as by blind folly within Britain's own
leadership.''(p.4 76)
The last third of the book is devoted to the
period after 1943. The preparations and the
organization for the D-day landings, Operation
"Neptune," are given nearly one hundred pages
and are described, surely correctly, as one of
the outstanding feats of staff work ever to be
performed by any military organization.
Admiral Ramsay correctly gets all the credit for
this. The last chapter deals with the British
participation in the war against Japan. The
relatively small part which the Royal Navy was
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strategic dilemmas during the Second World
War, of its worst disasters and most tragic
losses, are to be found in the twenty years of
national illusion, neglect and belated awakening
that had gone before," sets the tone for much
of the first section of the book. Like the whine
of a bearing running hot, Barnett again and
again blames the failures and tragedies of the
early part of the war on the 'lost years.' There
were many such failures-among the most
important of course were the diplomatic
decisions which led to the great reduction in
the Fleet, without reducing its responsibilities,
which in turn led to the loss of the highly
technical naval ship-building capacity of British
maritime industry, all part of the general loss
of Britain's industrial leadership. Barnett also
draws attention to many other aspects of the
loss of this leadership both inside and outside
the Navy,

Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay

able to play in that great maritime conflict was,
in Barnett's view, the direct result ofthe failure
to provide the Fleet with the kind of modern
equipment which had become standard in the
U.S. Navy.
Barnett naturally builds on his previous
work with respect to the great failure of Britain
to maintain its industrial and military strength
following the First World War. The prologue,
entitled, The German Ensign will be hauled
down at Sunset,' has many harsh things to say
about the Navy's performance during the First
World War-many of them already rehearsed
in Barnett's essay on Jellicoe in The
Swordbearers, but the conclusion of the
prologue, "And indeed the root causes of all the
Navy's coming tribulations and enduring

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham
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HMS Warspite
A Ship of the Line

HMS Warspite's last engagement: The bombardment ojWalcheren Island, November 1944.
(Imperial War Museum. A 23916)

The one ship that one might say justified the Royal Navy'sfaith in battleships. The seventh ship bearing
her name, she lay in the line at Jutland and was present when the Germanfleet surrendered. In the Second World
War she sank German destroyers at Narvik and Italian cruisers at Matapan; she engaged, hit and put to flight
two Italian cruisers offCalabria; she served as Cunningham's Flagship throughout her time in the Mediterranean.
Badly hit off Crete, she sailed around the world to be repaired at Bremerton Naval Base in Seattle and sailedfrom
Vancouver to Tricomalee to become the Flagship and the only 'Jast" ship in Somerville's Eastern Fleet. She was
back in the Mediterraneanfor Operation "Husky" and was again the FLagship when the Italianfleet surrendered.
Now her main enemies became the German Army and the German Air Force. At Salerno where her guns were
used against the German Army, she was attacked by the newest of weapons, radio-controlled (smart) bombs.
Three were launched against her, one was a near-miss and one penetrated the ship causing extensive damage.
Nevertheless she was back on station firing her guns at the German Army during the Normandy campaign and
ended her career supporting the Canadian Army's Walcheren operations to open the Scheldt in November 1944.
Throughout her thirty years of service she had a marked tendency to jam her rudder while turning at high
speed, which no amount of refits and repairs could alter. She turned two full circles towards the German Fleet
at Jutland and the whole ofthe German van concentrated itsfire on her. She often repeated this peculiar maneuver
during the Second World War and, when she was finally being towed to the breaker's yard, her stubborn and
independent spirit reasserted itself and she broke her tow and beached herself on the coast of Cornwall. Nothing
could be done to pull her o.ff and she had to be broken up ashore at Prussia Cove. "Belli dura despicio."
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HMS Illustrious returning to duty in 1942 after being hit by 12 bombs-ajeat which no other class ofcarriers could
have survived. At the time it was one of the world's most modem carriers but it was still equipped with some
very old fashioned biplanes. As Barnett correctly underlines, this discrepancy was due mainly to neglect by the
Royal Air Force which never understood the need for adequate carrier planes in the inter-war period. By the time
the Navy became responsible it was already too late.

such as the lack of adequate carrier planes, the
failure to adopt the tachymetric fire-control for
the Fleet's anti-aircraft weapons, the continuing
emphasis in Admiralty planning on large Fleet
actions, based mainly on the assumption that
the main maritime enemy would be Japan;
indeed the Navy is described as having a neoVictorian character during the inter-war years.
Perhaps so, but it was a character that
nevertheless enabled it, with its outdated
weapons, to take the Army out of harms wayfrom Norway, from France, from Greece, to
prevent an invasion of the British Isles and to
keep open the sea-lanes, despite the terrible
losses which were sustained during that time.
It was after all the determination, the dedication
and the professionalism, as Barnett points
out, which allowed the Fleet to win the defensive
war against Germany and the more offensive
one against Italy.

Barnett has some very strong views on a
variety of strategic issues. Most particularly of
course he regards the whole Mediterranean
campaign as a major error and within that
'blue water' strategy, the defence of Malta is
described as "less as a British strategic asset
than as a hostage to the enemy" (p.491) One
does not have to agree with him on all of his
views, particularly since we are given no real
alternatives, but one has to recognize the
cogency and clarity of his arguments. And
again it was the failures of British diplomacy
during the inter-war years which were,
according to Barnett, the main reasons for
British defeats, particularly the failure to renew
the Japanese alliance and the unnecessary
alienation ofMussolini. "On 7 December Britain
found herself at war with three great powers
simultaneously-the pre-war Chiefs of Staffs
ultimate nightmare. The moment ofbankruptcy
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view of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, in
suggesting that he was not really fit for the
position which he held throughout the crucial
years. Yet Pound was often right in his views
and managed in those early years, before the
Chiefs of Staff Committee had really learned to
cope, at least partially, with its impetuous
leader, to prevent Churchill
from carrying out his more
outrageous ideas, such as
Operation "Catherine." He also,
as Barnett relates, prevented
him from interfering with
Harwood's tactics in the Battle
of the River Plate. He could not
prevent such interference
during
the
Norwegian
Campaign, and as the tragedy
of PQ 17 illustrated, he was
prone to interfere himself. Still
he did lead the Royal Navy
through its most difficult time
and, if he was not a great
strategic mind, he was right
about a good many things such
as the dispatch of Force Z, and
often where Barnett faults him
there is room for debate. For
instance over the absolutely
crucial question of the
disposition of the Fleet in the
summer of 1940, Barnett
suggests that Forbes was right
about the impossibility of an
invasion and that therefore the
disposition of the Fleet's
destroyers and cruisers was
wasteful and dangerous. That
is surely hindsight, given what
the Germans had managed in
Norway. Indeed while air
The leadership of the Royal
superiority was unquestionably
Navy during the war has not
Admiral of the Fleet
important. its importance has
produced
the
kind
of
Sir Dudley Pound
often been greatly exaggerated,
controversy among historians
which has engendered a veritable flood ofbooks
especially in the early part of the war. The
on the Bomber Offensive and the campaigns in
Royal Navy managed to get the British Army
Italy and North-West Europe. It produced
both to and from Norway without it, from
Dunkirk while it was in dispute and from
neither a monomaniac, like Harris, nor an
Greece with the Germans in absolute control of
egomaniac like Montgomery. Its admirals,
the air. Moreover despite the total air superiority
despite the locust years, were largely competent
professionals, and, in the Navy, the price of
which the Germans enjoyed in the eastern
Mediterranean, not a single German soldier
failure, like that of Holland and Phillips, was
managed to get to Crete by sea. No doubt the
very often death. Barnett follows the traditional

for British 'total strategy' since the end of the
Great War had arrived." (p.377) Surely it is
here that Barnett has pushed his thesis too
far-was British diplomacy really in a position
to alter the course of Italian and Japanese
policy? Barnett dedicates his book to Stephen
Roskill, whose work he clearly recognizes as
being the unrivalled record of
the Royal Navy during the War.
Perhaps he should sometimes
have taken note ofRoskill's more
measured conclusions. For
instance, Roskill ends his
account of the surrender of the
Italian Fleet with" ... he closed a
chapter in British history which,
but for the unscrupulous
opportunism of a dictator, need
never have been written."
(Roskill, Vol. III, part I, pp.169170) Barnett concludes his,
very similar account of that
surrender with ". . . the Italian
menace so quixotically and
unnecessarily raised up by
British diplomacy (and public
opinion) in the Abyssinian crisis
of 1935-36 had at last been
removed. "(p.670)
Surely
Mussolini's declaration of war
in June 1940 owed more to his
opportunism than to his
resentment ofBritish opposition
to his, in any case successful,
Abyssinian adventure five years
earlier. Perhaps there were
some things over which British
diplomacy had little control
during these crucial years.
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cost was high, but surely Pound was right in
maintaining his Fleet in a position which could
prevent a high-stakes German gamble from
paying off. Pound originally opposed the attack
on the French Fleet and, in one of the very few
important omissions in this book, Barnett fails
to explain that he changed his mind when the
French battleship Richelieu, which Pound
considered to be one ofthe most powerful ships
afloat, sailed from Dakar on June 25th,
presumably on her way to France. She turned
back when intercepted by H.M.S. Dorsetshire
on the 27th but not before Pound had to make
major changes in the disposition of some of his
main units. It was after this that he would no
longer trust Darlan's word and shifted his
support to Churchill's proposals. Barnett's
summary of Pound's record as First Sea Lord
(pp. 731-734), while somewhat more
complimentary than his original introduction
of him (pp. 50-51) might have emphasized
more of his positive contributions to the Royal
Navy's most difficult but, in the final analysis,
successful years.
Barnett has really only one standard against
which to measure the sailors of this war. That
standard is Nelson, who, although mentioned
only three times in the index, is used almost as
an adjective so often that one loses count after
thirty odd mentions of him. Kennedy (of the
Rawalpindi) was "obedient to Nelson's
spirit."(p.74) Langsdorff took "un-Nelsonian
decisions."(p.86) "Nothing could have been
more Nelsonian" than Warburton-Lee's
actions.(p.ll6) "Churchill confronted it [the
problem of the French Fleet] with the ruthless
decision ... of a Nelson."(p.l73) Cunningham
had "... a spare and muscular body tense with
a Nelsonian impatience for action ... "(p.272)
Tovey spoke ". . . in language with a true
Nelsonian ring .... " (p.314) H.M.S. Valiant
". . . fired five [salvoes] in just over three
minutes, a rate faithful to the traditions of
Nelson'sMediterraneanFleet ... " (p.343), Vian's
tactics were "absolutely true to the tradition of
Hawke and Nelson ... ," (p.500) Mountbatten
"... rivalled Nelson in his hunger for admiration
and surpassed him in his appetite for personal
aggrandizement. .. "(p.869).

The end of the war, in Barnett's view, also
marked the end of British seapower, "... it was
like a ship still on even keel, not yet perceptibly
lower in the water, but with her bottom blown
out. "(p.881) Despite the acerbic criticism which
Barnett directs at British inter-war and even
war policy, there is no doubt that he judges
that the performance ofthe Royal Navy during
the war, despite its flawed weapons and its
mistaken faith in the battleship, was wholly
admirable. Unlike Roskill, he does not explicitly
attribute this to the survival ofthe traditions of
the Service. Yet his conclusion is both true and
as, he himself suggests, contains a "poignant
paradox ... Adversity had rescued the Navy
from the arrogant complacency bequeathed by
the Victorian era, and which had marred its
performance in the Great War; had awoken it
from the conservatism and torpor of the interwar years; and had restored it to the bold,
hardy, resourceful and highly professional
service that it was in Nelson's time."(p.881)
This is certainly the ultimate compliment by
Barnett's standards. But surely the paradox is
that it was precisely the respect for tradition,
the conservatism which he so often criticizes,
even its faith in battleships, that enabled the
Royal Navy to perform its duty with such elan
and success during the Second World War.

Robert Vogel is Professor of History at
McGill University and co-author of the
Maple LeqfRoute series. Professor Vogel is
a Contributing Editor of CMH.

Opposite: Night attack on a German U-boat: Dropping
flares, an RAF Coastal Command plane attacks a
German submarinefrom 75 feet. A depth charge can
be seen exploding near the centre of the photo
(Official U.S. Air Force Photo 54635 AC)
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